Consistent with the literature, our estimates indicate that physical depreciation, size and building class are relevant determinants of rent. We also find a substantial rent premium in the market for larger office space and that asset quality is more relevant in this niche when we control for spatial variation. Rent premiums associated with building class are monotonically increasing, but not strictly positive as reported by Eichholtz et al. (2010) , Fuerst and McAllister (2011) and Reichardt et al. (2012) . For instance, we do not clear indication of incremental rent in AAA buildings relative to AA assets. Low tier A-rated and high tier B-rated assets do not necessarily have different premiums in the corporate market niche. Evidence also neglects the existence of rent premiums linked with building class in the office segment.
These results reinforce the importance of considering niches in the "office market", especially when investors design their development and redevelopment plans with the goal of maximizing potential income. The lack of rent premiums associated with asset quality in office markets is consistent with a perfect competition equilibrium. Consequently, asset quality in this segment should ideally be tied to acceptable standards of the target submarket. An investor holding a better-than-average office building does not yield higher income as tenants in this niche are less concerned with asset-specific amenities. A worse-than-average office building could leave investors prone to vacancy risk due to stronger competition among developers (Schwartz and Torous (2007) and Bulan et al. (2009) ). At the same time, the positive relationship between building class and rent premiums in the corporate segment suggests that it is possible to obtain incremental rent when asset quality is improved.
Ignoring the existence of market segments in the analysis of commercial towers may bias asset quality coeficients towards a middle point between their actual value in corporate and office niches. As a result, the shadow price of a given amenity, such as an environmental certification, may be overestimated or underestimated, depending on whether the investor holds a corporate or office building.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes our dataset, variables and identification strategy, section 3 discusses our empirical estimates and section 4 concludes.
VARIABLES AND DATA COLLECTION
We obtained our data from CRE Tool, which offers an extensive appraisal dataset for corporate and office market niches in various cities in Brazil. This system is provided by Buildings 1 , a company solely specialized in real estate research. According to Buildings, all data from CRE Tool is collected from landlords, brokers and/or through visits in each asset and is updated on a quarterly basis. The data covers c. 2200 commercial towers in the corporate and office markets of the city of Sao Paulo from 2005:Q3 to 2014:Q3 on a quarterly basis.
Variables
Our sample is divided in 14 submarkets and contains information about asking rent (AskRent) and the following characteristics for each building in these submarkets.
Corporate
= a dummy defining whether an asset belongs to the corporate or office market niche. This variable is set to one when an asset belongs to the first segment at a given period of time and zero otherwise For more details regarding Buildings, please visit their website: http://www.buildings.com.br
Rating
= a dummy to capture each building class (standard categories AAA, AA, A, BB, B and C). Buildings classifies Rating based on objective (i.e. gross leasable area, floor area, size and age) and subjective (i.e current ocupation, corporate image and quality of technical specifications) characteristics of each asset. This variable is set to one when an asset belongs to a certain class at a given period of time and zero otherwise. All C class buildings were set to zero to avoid perfect multicolinearity. Thus all other classes are measured as premiums relative to this class. Age = measured from the year of construction or the year of a major refurbishment (whichever occurred more recently). Observations for building age were segmented into thresholds to allow for potentially time-varying age effects. If a building belongs to a certain age group, this variable takes the value of one and zero otherwise. All assets that are less than 4 years old were set to zero to avoid perfect multicolinearity. Hence parameters for all age thresholds represent discounts relative to new assets Size = the natural logarithm of the gross leasable area measured in squared meters VacPerc = the percentage of vacancy relative to the gross leasable area multiplied by one hundred
We include a dummy called Corporate to consider different market niches based on the average size of leasable areas inside a building. This division is generally subjective in practice, but practicioners recognize the importance of segmenting office markets. For simplicity we considered assets with average leasable area larger than 100 sqm to be part of the corporate niche and the remainder as part of the office market. As explained in the previous section, this variable captures the unobserved role of different participants and commoditized leasable space that make the office market structure closer to a perfect competition model.
In order to isolate the relationship between Corporate and potential income, we included other building characteristics to control for asset-specific heterogeneity. Among these we find Rating, Size, Age, and VacPerc. The model also contains time dummies to capture economic shocks and submarket dummies and to control for spatial variation. All of these variables are widely discussed in the real estate literature.
Many authors include an "A, B and C" scale of building class to control for asset quality. Eichholtz et al. (2010) , Fuerst and McAllister (2011) and Reichardt et al. (2012) , find a premium of roughly 20% in A-rated assets over C-rated peers and of 9 to 13% in B-rated assets over C-rated assets in the U.S office market. These findings suggest a strictly positive relation between asset quality and income. We use a similar Rating proxy with more layers, namely AAA, AA, A, BB, B and C, based on objective and subjective characteristics of each asset. This rating system is defined by Buildings.
Research on other determinants of rent is considerably more developed. Assetspecific characteristics, such as age, size and vacancy are commonly found as significant in income and price equations. Clapp (1980 ), Bollinger et. all (1998 , Slade (2000) and Dunse et al. (2003) discuss the role of age as a relevant physical characteristic in real estate pricing. Early work by Clapp (1980) , Glascock et al. (1990) , Bollinger et al. (1998) recognize the role of building size and floor area. Glascock et al. (1990) also find a link between rent prices and vacancy. Pollakowski et al. (1992) and Hendershott et al. (2002) provide further empirical evidence of this link in office markets. Similar results for most of these characteristics are also found in recent research from Eichholtz et al. (2010) , Brounnen and Kok (2011), Fuerst and McAllister (2011) and Reichardt et al. (2012) .
Several papers discuss the relevance of macroeconomic and credit shocks on real estate prices and income (e.g. Gyourko and Voith (1992) , Lamont and Stein (1999) , Malpezzi (1999) , Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) , Davis and Zhu (2004) , Himmelberg, et al. (2005) , Cubedu et al. (2009) , Mian and Sufi (2009), Plazzi et al. (2010) and Favilukis et al. (2012) ). Given the concern with overall market conditions, we include time dummies to isolate variation common to all assets.
As far as our research allows, there are three traditional ways to control for spatial variation in the literature. Glasscock et al. (1990) , Weathon and Torto (1994) and Fuerst and McAllister (2011) use submarket or city dummies. Rosen (1984) , Webb & Fisher (1996) and Gunnelin and Soderberg (2003) avoid the need to control for location by estimating separate regressions in small regions and submarkets. Sivitanidou (1995 Sivitanidou ( , 1996 , Bollinger et at. (1998) and Oven and Pekdemir (2006) control for spatial variation based on the distance from important locations, such as a railway station. unobserved heterogeneity related to spatial and asset-specific variation. According to these authors, it is important to consider characteristics which may be omitted when controlling for location and asset quality. These variables might be correlated with ommitted variables which are unique to each asset. Abnormal car traffic and criminality or large concentration of high quality buildings in a given submarket may render hedonic models prone to both omitted variable and selection bias due to data censoring (Ghysels et al. (2013) ). The problem with specific clusters is that they limit our ability to isolate spatial, locational and asset-specific features of real estate assets, which are a crucial part of hedonic modelling. Within some of these clusters, there are likely to be different qualities of location (Fuerst and McAllister (2011) ). The significant variation in the density of development and size of submarket in different locations are also captured in very small clusters. Chen et al. (2009) and Bourassa et al. (2003) suggest that submarkets boundaries drawn using a priori information from experts have better in-sample performance than than statistically determined clusters.
Albeit the advantages of specific clusters to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we adopt clusters of well-established submarkets in our hedonic model. Sirmans et al. (2006) use various datasets to estimate log-linear models and find that shadow prices for similar characteristics appear to be rather stable when they control for spatial variation. The 14 submarkets we cover are Barra Funda, Berrini, Centro, Chacara Santo Antonio, Faria Lima/Itaim Bibi, Marginal Pinheiros, Moema/Vila Mariana, Morumbi/Jardim São Luiz, Paulista, Pinheiros/Perdizes, Santo Amaro, Saude/Jabaquara, Vila Olimpia and Other. These submarkets are located in the heart of the city of Sao Paulo and have substantial commercial activity.
Identification Strategy
To test the hypothesis of a premium in the corporate niche, we use a standard log-linear hedonic approach. Given that we have panel data, we control for other asset-specific characteristics, macroeconomic shocks and spatial variation. The general empirical model takes the following form:
(1)
Where is the natural logarithm of asked rent per square foot for asset "i" on submarket "m" at time "t", is a dummy set to 1 if a building belongs to the corporate niche, is a vector of dummies associated with each letter grade and is a vector of asset-specific control variables, namely Size, Age and Vacancy. The remaining controls, , a vector of location dummies used to capture the impact of submarket "m" which may be common to all assets in a given submarket, and , a vector of time dummies used to isolate macroeconomic shocks common to all assets at a given point in time. and are a constant and an error term, respectively. The hypothesis of a premium or discount in the corporate niche is validated if the parameter of is different than zero. In order to assess the relationship between asset quality and asking rent in each market segment, we also consider interactions between and in an alternative specification:
Where is a vector of interaction terms between each letter grade and the Corporate dummy. This variable reflects the average incremental rent associated with each building class in the corporate segment. If demand corporate niche is indeed more sensible to asset quality, this term will be positive. Note that vector now captures the remaining average rent premium associated with each letter grade in this new specification. Because the Corporate dummy is equal to 0 in the office niche, we can also interprete this term as the elasticity of incremental rent with respect to building class in the office segment.
Data Collection
The descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1 . At a glance, there are some differences between the market niches and their respective building classes. Assets in the corporate segment tend to be larger, but not necessarily across all building classes. The mean size of corporate buildings is 6.4 thousand sqm while that of office buildings is 3.8 sqm; however, B-rated assets in the office niche are slightly larger than their peers in the corporate segment. Higher class buildings also tend to be larger and newer in both niches. AAA and AA buildings in the corporate segment have, respectively, mean sizes of 34.5 and 18.4 thousand sqm. The comparable figure for AA assets in the office niche is 20.3 sqm. The average age of A-rated buildings in both corporate and office segments is well below the sample mean. These stylized facts reinforce the need to control for asset-specific characteristics when studying market niches and building classes.
Without controlling for the differences between the asset classes, top quality buildings have higher AskRent than lower tier assets. Nevertheless, this indicator is not homogeneous when we compare the niches. While mean AskRent of C-rated buildings are BRL 32.73 and 34.32, respectively, in the corporate and office segments, the same figure for BB-rated buildings is on average larger in the corporate niche (BRL 49.71 vs. 37.59 ). This gap widens as we compare higher-end assets. The average AskRent of AA-rated buildings in the corporate and office segments are, respectively, BRL 106.95 and 84.87. These preliminary indicators suggest the existence of a rent premium in the corporate niche and income tends to be less sensible to different levels of asset quality in the office segment.
Although sample size increased from 1804 in 2182 buildings between 2005:Q3 and 2014:Q3, table 2 indicates that the distribution of assets in is fairly homogeneous over time. Centro, Faria Lima/Itaim Bibi and Paulista are the largest submarkets of Sao Paulo and account for slightly over 50% of the whole sample. The saturated submarkets of Centro and Paulista lost some their relative importance to growth submarkets, such as Berrini, Vila Olimpia, Marginal Pinheiros and Moema/Vila Mariana, over the last years.
Mean AskRent rose substantially over the last decade and stagnated since 2012 (Figure 2 ) for most submarkets. Note that income also varies substantially across submarkets. For instance, mean AskRent in Centro and Marginal Pinheiros were BRL 29.03 and 96.52, respectively in 2014:Q3. These stylized facts reinforce the need to control for location and time in order to successfully isolate the relationship between asset quality variables and AskRent.
Although the full database has 71778 observations, we only work with 20556 observations for two reasons. First, not all assets have AskRent at all times. In these cases the building is only quoted in the market when there is some vacancy. Note that the number of observations for VacPerc and AskRent is very similar and the existence of observations often coincides in our dataset. Several assets do not have AskRent in any of the periods covered because they are either occupied by their respective owner or under long-term leases. Table 3 indicates that asset-specific variables, namely Age, Size, Corporate and Rating are significantly correlated with AskRent. A-rated assets have higher correlation with AskRent than their B-rated peers. This correlation; however, is not homogeneous within each rated group. AAA-rated assets have a lower correlation (0.21) with AskRent than their AA-rated (0.26) and A-rated (0.32) peers. This could a priori be explained by the correlation between building class and submarkets (these results are not reported, but are available upon request). Table 4 reports regression results of equations (1) and (2). Standard errors in all estimates are clustered at submarket level as in Reichardt et al. (2012) . Regression (I) tests whether the parameter of Corporate is positive, reflecting the suggestive evidence of a premium in the market for larger office space found in the previous section. We find that Corporate has an average premium of 12.2% on ln_AskRent, holding constant other asset-specific characteristics, locational features and macroeconomic shocks.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The "AAA, AA, A, BB, B and C" rating system provided by Buildings enables us to study the relationship between building class and potential income across and within letter grades. As expected, A class assets have positive link with our left-hand side variable and this link is statistically larger than that of B class. These results suggest that rent premiuns are generally increasing with asset quality. Nevertheless, this positive relationship becomes less clear when we study asset quality within letter grades. For instance, find little evidence of incremental rent in B class observations as the positive premium of 3.4% is not statistically significant. Among the top quality buildings, AAA and AA have rent premiuns of 27.2% and 31.3%. The difference between these parameters is also not statistically significant. These outcomes are inconsistent with the strictly positive relationship across letter grades found in recent research from Eichholtz et al. (2010) , Fuerst and McAllister (2011) and Reichardt et al. (2012) . Note that these authors use a general "A, B and C" scale to control for building class.
Although the premium observed in regression (I) reinforces the structural difference between corporate and office segments, it does not allows us to analyze the economic motivation behind this effect in detail. For this reason we turn our attention to the corporate and office niches separately. Instead of adding the Corporate dummy we split the sample for each segment to study the behavior asset-specific variables. Regressions (II) and (III), respectively, report the results for the corporate and office niches. Size and Age remain significant in this alternative setting. Nevertheless Size is only significant at 10% level for the office niche and its premium is statistically lower than that of the corporate segment. Age parameters indicate that the relationship between depreciation and ln_AskRent is similar until 11 to 15 years. Beyond this threshold the correlation between Age and income is significantly larger in the corporate niche. These findings reinforce that tenants in the markets for smaller office space are less concerned with overall building size and more tolerant to larger levels of physical depreciation.
Rating significance also varies substantially between corporate and office segments. On one hand, building class is a relevant determinant of income across and within letter grades when we consider the market for larger office space. There are; however, a few exceptions to this rule. Regression (II) shows that AAA class buildings have inferior income levels relative to AA-rated peers. We cannot interprete this result in a straightforward way as AAA buildings are highly clustered in developed submarkets, such as Faria Lima/Itaim, Marginal Pinheiros and Berrini. We also find that the premiums of A-rated (19.5%) and BB-rated (20.4%) assets are now statistically equal, suggesting that the ramp up of ln_AskRent is not strictly positive when we consider lower tier A-rated and high tier B-rated buildings.
At the same time, results from regression (III) suggest that Rating is on average not significant at any level of building class. Athough this outcome provides further evidence that tenants in office markets are unwilling to pay more rent for assets of higher quality, we have to be careful when interpreting this result. Larger supply-side competition and commoditization of smaller office space lead assets with different quality to be censored in different submarkets. The vast majority of upper class office buildings in our sample, namely AA, A and BB, is concentrated in a few submarkets. Hence it is probable that the submarket dummy captured the bulk of the variation associated with asset quality. As a robustness check, we ran a similar regression without the submarket controls and found that Rating was significant in office markets (these results are not reported, but are available upon request). We can thus infer that it is unlikely that an asset which deviates from acceptable building class standards of a given submarket is able to generate larger income.
Regressions (IV) and (V) report results from equation (2) and provide further evidence regarding the smaller role of asset quality as a determinant of potential income in office markets. These regressions consider the entire sample and the vector of interaction terms between Corporate and Rating. Note that the significance of standalone letter grades are now associated with the office segment as the Corporate dummy has a value of zero when a building belongs to this niche.
The outcome of these two regressions is consistent with the results found in regressions (II) and (III). The vector of interaction terms is positive in (IV) and (V), suggesting that asset quality and potential income are positively correlated in the corporate niche. In contrast, Rating is not different than zero for all letter grades, except for AAA class. The reason behind this is that our sample does not contain any office buildings in this group (see Table 1 ).
It is worth noting that the coefficient of the interaction terms in (IV) and (V) is fairly similar to the sum of a comparable letter grade and the corporate niche premium found in regression (I). For instance, the premium of an AA class in the corporate niche was 52.6% in regression (V) while the same figure in (I) is 43.5% (31.3% plus 12.2%). Incremental rent associated with a BB class asset is 25.0% in regression (V) while the same figure in (I) is 25.1% (12.9% plus 12.2%). The Corporate dummy becomes statistically equal to zero when we include the vector of interaction terms. These results suggest that the significance of Rating found in regression (I) is linked with asset quality of buildings from the corporate niche. Hence ignoring the existence of market segments in the analysis of commercial towers may bias asset quality coeficients towards a middle point between their actual value in corporate and office niches.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The take away from this empirical analysis is that landlords may boost property income by developing or redeveloping their assets. There are; however, certain refurbishment strategies which are more suitable to maximize value given the structural differences between corporate and office segments. We find that the market for larger office space holds an average rent premium of 12%, suggesting that an investor is likely to lose potential income in case it plans to divide its leasable area in smaller office space.
Even tough A-rated buildings generally offer considerably higher rent premiums than B-rated peers, building class rent premiuns are monotonically increasing, but not strictly positive as suggested in Eichholtz et al. (2010) and Fuerst and McAllister (2011) and Reichardt et al. (2012) . For instance, we do not find evidence of such positive relationship in the office niche when we control for spatial variation. These findings reflect the stronger competition among developers in the office niche and commoditization of smaller office space due to the lower propensity of tenants to pay more for amenities beyond submarket standards.
These results have important implications for real estate investors for two key reasons. First, asset quality in the office segment should ideally be tied to acceptable standards of the target submarket. Holding a better-than-average building does not yield higher income as tenants are reluctant to pay a premium for asset-specific amenities. A worse-than-average office building could leave investors prone to vacancy risk due to stronger competition among developers (Schwartz and Torous (2007) and Bulan et al. 2009) ). The positive relationship between asset class and incremental rent in the corporate segment suggests that it is possible to boost potential income when building quality is improved. Second, the heterogeous valuation of asset quality in similar locations by different niche participants may render hedonic models prone to omitted variable bias. Estimates of the shadow price of a given amenity, such as an environmental certification, may be overestimated or underestimated, depending on whether the investor holds a corporate or office building.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Real estate investors are particularly interested in asset quality because it can be strategically manipulated to increase income levels. At the same time practitioners claim that overall structure of the market for smaller office space (office) is closer to a perfect competition model, where buildings and lease covenants are commoditized and landlords price takers. For this reason we test the existence of rent premiums in different niches of the office market and whether the relationship between potential income and asset quality is homogeneously positive in each of these segments.
We use an unique database of c. 2200 commercial towers located in the city of Sao Paulo from 2005:Q3 to 2014:Q3 to test these hypotheses. The specification strategy is a standard log-linear hedonic model that includes a time dummies, submarket dummies and asset-specific variables as controls. The empirical estimates include a segment dummy variable and interactions between market niches and building class.
The results confirm the existence of a premium in the market for larger office space (corporate) and the that income in this segment is indeed more sensible to different levels of asset quality when we control for spatial variation. We also find that rent premiums associated with building class are monotonically increasing, but not strictly positive across certain quality thresholds, especially in the office segment.
These findings suggest that development and redevelopment strategies should take into consideration the structural differences between these market niches. Given the stronger competition in the office segment, investors should ideally link asset quality to acceptable standards of the target submarket. An investor holding a better-than-average building is unlikely to be compensated with higher income as tenants are not willing to pay a premium for asset-specific amenities. In contrast, a worse-than-average office building could leave investors prone to vacancy risk due to stronger competition among developers (Schwartz and Torous (2007) and Bulan et al. 2009) ). The generally positive liaison between building class and rent premiums in the corporate segment reinforces the possibility of income gains associated with amenities that improve building quality.
Ignoring the existence of market segments in hedonic models may bias asset quality coeficients towards a middle point between its actual value in corporate and office niches. Estimates of the shadow price of a given amenity, such as an environmental certification, may be overestimated or underestimated, depending on whether the investor holds a corporate or office building.
We recognize that our results are also prone to critiques regarding external validity and measurement error. We do not test whether these findings hold out of sample, namely in other metropolitan areas, nor which objective and subjective amenities are relevant to each niche on a stand-alone basis. Our empirical estimates also do not consider the behavior of actual rent, limiting their applicability to potential income (but not to actual income). Moreover, the unobserved difference between actual and asking rent may challenge our findings if this measurement error is systematically correlated with asset quality. These are potential opportunities for future research upon availability of reliable data.
